This paper analyzes the consequences of cross-border mergers in a spatial framework, thereby distinguishing three channels of influence: a price increase due to the elimination of product market competition, an adjustment in plant location which reduces overall transportation cost expenditures, and a harmonization in production costs due to a technology transfer within the firm. The welfare analysis illustrates that larger countries are better off after the merger. By contrast, smaller countries may lose, if the pre-merger production cost differential across firms is negligible and/or a post-merger technology transfer across production sites is infeasible. Furthermore, the analysis provides novel insights into the trade pattern effects of a merger. One important result of the paper is that an adjustment of plant location in space can reverse the direction of (net) trade flows.
Introduction
It is now well established that cross-border mergers are the predominant form of foreign direct investment (FDI). In particular, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that cross-border mergers outnumber foreign greenfield investments and that their share in overall FDI has considerably increased in recent years (UNCTAD, 2007) . Despite this empirical regularity, "the theoretical literature on cross-border mergers is tiny, both in absolute terms and relative to the enormous literature on greenfield FDI" (Neary, 2007 (Neary, , p. 1229 . It is therefore not surprising that key issues with cross-border mergers are still unexplored. To be more specific, while existing studies emphasize the role of international trade costs and trade as well as competition policy for understanding the patterns of crossborder mergers, an analysis of spatial aspects of mergers in a setting where countries have a geographical dimension is missing so far.
1
The conclusion that a rigorous treatment of merger effects requires a detailed analysis of spatial implications can be deduced from the empirical observation that "firms that have been involved in a merger or an acquisition are much more likely to relocate than other firms" (Brouwer, Mariotti, and van Ommeren, 2004, p. 345) .
2 The relevance of such relocations for the existence of merger gains has been put forward by recent 1 Falvey (1998), Huck and Konrad (2004) , and Saggi and Yildiz (2006) study the interaction between national policy and cross-border mergers. Horn and Persson (2001) and Bjorvatn (2004) have elaborated on the differential impact that changes in trade costs exhibit on the incentives for greenfield FDI and the acquisition of existing plants. They argue that, contrary to the tariff-jumping argument, cross-border mergers may be stimulated by a decline in international trade costs. In a similar vein, Neary (2003 Neary ( , 2007 shows that trade liberalization may trigger merger waves. However, in contrast to previous work he uses a general oligopolistic equilibrium framework and thus allows for income and factor price effects. Hijzen, Görg, and Manchin (2008) provide empirical support for a negative relationship between trade costs and mergers. Aside from these policy-related determinants of foreign investment, Yeaple (2007, 2008) have pointed to the role of firm-specific characteristics for explaining the patterns of cross-border mergers and greenfield FDI. 2 This finding is consistent with the evidence that branch plants of multiplant firms are considerably more geographically mobile than single plant firms (see Siegfried and Sweeney, 2006, p. 89) .
theoretical work on the matter (Norman and Pepall, 2000; Posada and Straume, 2004; Cosnita, 2005) . 3 However, the existing studies do not account for cross-border mergers which, according to Horn and Stennek (2007) , is unsatisfying because these studies cannot contribute to our understanding of one aspect of mergers that is particularly relevant in the context of European merger policy: cross-border relocation of plants and its implication for national welfare and international trade.
Spatial aspects of countries play in general only a minor role in international economic theory. And the small number of existing studies has focused on trade rather than foreign investment. Tharakan and Thisse (2002) crafted a variant of Hotelling's (1929) line model to consider the role of intranational transport costs and country size for firm location and the pattern of cross-border goods trade. 4 Egger and Egger (2007) have extended this model to account for international and intranational outsourcing. A seminal contribution to the literature on trade in a spatial setting is Rossi-Hansberg (2005) , who considers a continuum of regions (countries) on a line to investigate the relationship between the spatial distribution of economic activity and the trade pattern. A shortcoming of these and related spatial models of international trade is that they do not consider cross-border mergers.
It is the purpose of this paper to link the literature on cross-border mergers to recent work on trade in a spatial modelà la Hotelling. The starting point of our analysis is the long-run free trade equilibrium in Tharakan and Thisse (2002) with two unequally sized countries (represented by differently sized segments of a line), quadratic transport costs, and two firms -one located at the Western bound and the other one at the Eastern 3 Interestingly, in the economic geography literature post-merger plant relocations have been treated as an important fact for years. Green and Cromley (1982, p. 361) emphasize for instance that "[t]he period of post-acquisition integration usually involves not only the reorganization of managerial control and changes in product lines but also a rearrangement in the location of factories and other corporate functions." 4 Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995) have also used the Hotelling line to study the consequences of trade liberalization in a spatial framework. However, as pointed out by Tharakan (2001) , the equilibrium analyzed there does not exist due to the assumption of linear transport costs.
bound of Hotelling's line, respectively. Unlike Tharakan and Thisse (2002) , we allow for differences in the production costs of the two firms. In this setting, a (horizontal) merger between the two firms gives rise to three sources of profit gains: (i) higher prices due to reduced product market competition; (ii) a relocation of production sites to reduce transport costs; and (iii) the use of the best-practice technology across production plants rather than the locally available one. While sources (i) and (iii) have been highlighted in the existing merger literature (see Neary, 2007 , for an overview), the second source of profit gain points to a new -and at least in the literature dealing with cross-border mergers so far unexplored -channel of influence, which is strictly spatial in nature.
5
A comparison of the equilibrium with independent (strategic) firm decisions and the equilibrium with joint profit maximization under the umbrella of an integrated firm provides the following insights regarding the possible merger-induced trade and welfare effects. First, the trade pattern in our model is determined by a non-trivial interplay of size and technology differences. And, for certain parameter domains, a merger may lead to a reversal of the direction of (net) trade flows. We characterize these domains and develop a measure for the "likelihood of a trade reversal". We also discuss the relationship between the likelihood of a trade reversal and the (ex ante) cost differential between firms. 6 Second, the welfare analysis confirms the well-established result that a merger leads to profit gains which come at the cost of a loss in consumer surplus due to market 5 It is worth noting that, by choosing a Hotelling framework, we conduct our analysis in a setting with price competition. Significant differences between models of price competition and ones of quantity competition with regard to possible merger gains are well understood in industrial economics. See Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) , Deneckere and Davidson (1985) for two influential contributions on that matter. However, in our framework this distinction plays a minor role, since a merger induces a monopolization of the product market with a single integrated firm serving all consumers ex post. In this case, a merger is always profitable, irrespective of the prevailing mode of product market competition. 6 It is also worth noting that the merged firm may find it optimal to locate a production plant in either of the two countries and still trade the homogeneous good. Hence our spatial approach offers an explanation for simultaneous horizontal bilateral trade and horizontal multiplant activity. Despite its empirical support, this property is typically absent from existing models of horizontal multinational activity (see, e.g., Venables, 1998, 2000) monopolization. Overall welfare increases due to lower transport costs after an adjustment in firm location and/or due to the transfer of the best-practice technology across production sites. Furthermore, the merger-induced welfare gain rises with the pre-merger cost differential between the two firms. While this outcome is less surprising in the case of a technology transfer, it also holds if a technology transfer is excluded and the two plants differ in their production costs before and after the merger. The reason is that the integrated firm can relocate its production sites in order to (further) increase the market share of its low-cost plant. This points to a so far unexplored channel through which a merger influences welfare: adjustments of plant location in space.
Assuming that total profit income is equally distributed among consumers, we can also derive national (regional) welfare effects. In this respect, the main finding of our analysis is that a country tends to be worse off after the merger if it is sufficiently small and production cost differences are not too large. Again, it is the adjustment of firm location -and the associated increase of transport cost expenditures for consumers at the Eastern and Western end of the Hotelling line -which is responsible for this result. 7 Only if cost differences are sizable and a merger leads to a technology transfer with the best-practice technology being used in both production facilities, a welfare increase in every country is guaranteed, irrespective of the prevailing size differences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic model with free trade and two (independent) firms. The impact of a merger on plant location, prices, welfare and trade pattern is at the agenda of Section 3. There, we distinguish three scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume that firms do not differ in their production costs, in order to obtain a benchmark for the possible merger effects.
In scenario two, we consider production cost differences but exclude the possibility of a 7 Since in our analysis the small country is at risk of losing the local producer after the merger, our welfare results are in line with the respective claim in Horn and Stennek (2007) that cross-border mergers may be detrimental for EU member countries due to adverse international plant relocation. However, our framework gives a more sophisticated picture because it allows us to identify winners and losers within the countries under consideration.
technology transfer. The impact of a technology transfer is addressed in scenario three.
A distinction between these three scenarios is useful because it allows us to separate different channels of influence and derive a detailed picture of the possible merger effects in a Hotelling framework. Section 4 provides a short summary and some concluding remarks.
2 Basic model set-up: free trade with two firms
Consider a spatial modelà la Hotelling with two producers, one operating in the West (W ) and one in the East (E). Producer is located at address x on a line of length one: There is a unit mass of consumers which is uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
Consumers make a binary choice of purchasing one unit of the consumption good or nothing. They are identical with respect to their willingness to pay which we denote by A. A consumer's address is b ∈ [0, 1]. The two producers set mill prices p and consumers have to bear the shipping costs of (b − x ) 2 , which are quadratic in order to ensure existence of an equilibrium (see d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979) . Accordingly, the consumer price equals p(b, x ) = p + (b − x ) 2 for a consumer at address b who purchases the good from a producer located at x .
By maximizing utility, consumers choose the supplier who offers the lower consumer price. To focus on the relevant aspects of the model, we impose two further assumptions.
First, the willingness to pay (A) is sufficiently high to ensure full coverage of consumers in equilibrium: A > 5/4 + c/2 + c 2 /36. Second, production cost differences are sufficiently 8 In the borderline case of x W = x E , the model reduces to one with perfect price competition.
small to guarantee positive demand for each of the two producers in equilibrium: c ≤ 6 − √ 27. 9 In this case, consumer demand for output of the two firms is determined by
, which characterizes the address of the "marginal consumer":
Consumer demand for the producer with address x W is given by d W = b i , while consumer demand for its competitor with address x E is given by d E = 1 − b i . The corresponding profits of the two producers are
Profit maximization entails two stages. The producers choose their location in the first stage and set prices subsequently. The maximization problem can be solved through backward induction. For given locations, the price reaction functions are
according to (1)-(3). The two reaction functions confirm the well-known result that mill prices are strategic complements. By virtue of (4) and (5), sub-game-perfect equilibrium prices at stage two are given by
Substituting (6) and (7) in (1), we can express the marginal consumer's address as a function of firm location:
9 See the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix for a formal derivation of these conditions.
Furthermore, substituting (6)- (8) in (2) and (3), we can express profits as a function of
Solving for the profit-maximizing firm locations and using superscript n to refer to an equilibrium with independent producers (no merger), the following proposition can be established. Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 confirms the well-known result of maximum differentiation (in firm location) if transport costs are quadratic (see d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979) .
In addition, we see that an increase of production cost parameter c not only leads to a higher mill price of the Eastern producer, but also implies a higher mill price of the Western firm, as prices are strategic complements. However, the price increase of the Eastern firm is larger, so that the marginal consumer moves eastwards. As a consequence, the market share of the Western firm increases, while the market share of the Eastern firm declines.
In the following, we associate the Hotelling line with two integrated countries -thereby abstracting from any additional costs of shipping goods across the common border. The
Western country is of length r ∈ (0, 1) and the Eastern one of length 1−r. In this case, the trade pattern depends on the location of the common border at r relative to the address of the marginal consumer. If b n i > r, the Western country exports the consumption good, while the Eastern country exports, if b n i < r. In the case of identical production costs (c = 0), it is the smaller country that exports due to lower transport costs for serving consumers at the common border (see Tharakan and Thisse, 2002) . However, in the case of cost asymmetries the differential c > 0 matters as well (see Egger and Egger, 2007) .
A final element we are interested in is welfare, which, of course, depends on the profit maximizing location and price choices of firms. To be more specific, overall (world) welfare equals the sum of total profits Π n ≡ π n W + π n E = 1 + c 2 /9 and consumer surplus CS:
Hence, overall welfare is
It is intuitive that welfare declines in cost parameter c, because a higher c can be associated with a less efficient technology in the East.
To determine national welfare levels, the ownership structure of firms is important.
For simplicity, we assume that ownership of firms (and thus total profit income Π n ) is equally distributed among consumers. 10 Then, profit income in the Western country is given by rΠ n , while profit income in the Eastern country equals (1 − r)Π n . Noting further that national consumer surplus in W is given by
and
10 Note that this assumption differs from the respective assumption in Tharakan and Thisse (2002) , where firm ownership is country-specific. In the context of mergers, however, our approach is more convenient, because it does not require any further assumptions about the international distribution of merger gains. Similar assumptions regarding firm ownership can be found in the literature on international tax competition. See Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) for an example.
we obtain
for the national welfare levels in W and E, respectively.
This completes our discussion of the pre-merger equilibrium. In the next section, we investigate how a merger (and thus joint profit maximization) affects location and price decisions. We also analyze to which extent a technology transfer and the use of the bestpractice technology in both production plants influences these decisions. Furthermore, we compare welfare and the trade pattern in the pre-and post-merger equilibrium.
A merger between the two firms
To draw a comprehensive picture of the possible merger effects, we distinguish three alternative scenarios. In the first one, we assume that c = 0 holds both before and after the merger. This benchmark analysis allows us to investigate in detail how changes in the location decision and the price-setting behavior of firms affect the variables of interest.
In the second scenario, we allow for technology differences and consider asymmetric production costs which are the same before and after the merger takes place: c > 0. In the third scenario, we account for production cost differences in the pre-merger case, c > 0, and assume that the merger leads to a harmonization of production costs: c = 0. A comparison of the second and the third scenario highlights the consequences of a technology transfer.
Costs are identical ex ante and ex post
If c = 0, firms do not differ in their production costs. They set identical prices (p n W = p n E = 1) and realize the same level of profits (π n W = π n E = 1/2) in the pre-merger equilibrium (see Proposition 1). The two producers share the market equally (b n i = 1/2), so that it is the smaller country, i.e., country W if r < 1/2 and country E if r > 1/2, that exports the consumption good. This corresponds to the case of a long-run free trade equilibrium in Tharakan and Thisse (2001) . Fig. 1 gives a graphical representation of the price-location schedules in the pre-merger equilibrium (dashed lines). A merger between the two firms leads to a monopolization of the market and, therefore, to higher mill prices. By maximizing joint profits, the integrated firm increases prices until the most distant consumer that is served from a particular plant is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing the consumption good. In addition, moving both production sites to the interior of the market reduces transport costs and allows for a further increase in the mill prices. If production costs are identical, the integrated firm will choose those locations for its two production facilities, which minimize overall trans-port cost expenditures.
11 Altogether, joint profit-maximization leads to plant locations 
which is negative if A > 5/4 + c/2 + c 2 /36. Hence, a merger between the two firms exhibits two counteracting effects on overall (world) welfare. On the one hand, it raises profit income Π, but on the other hand, it reduces consumer surplus CS. For given aggregate demand, the profit gain dominates the consumer surplus loss, implying that overall welfare increases:
This welfare increase is due to a decline in overall transport cost expenditures and equals Fig. 1 .
11 This refers to one crucial difference between mergers in spatial and nonspatial models. As pointed out by Norman and Pepall (2000, pp. 668f) : "[I]n contrast to the standard nonspatial Cournot model, a merger between two firms need not result in one of them effectively being shut down. Rather, a merger between two firms allows them to coordinate their location decisions (...)". However, as discussed in the more general setting with cost asymmetry in section 3.2, the number of active plants in the post-merger equilibrium crucially depends on the size of c, i.e. the extent of production cost difference. 12 The consumer surplus in the pre-merger equilibrium is given by CS n = A − 13/12, according to (11), while the consumer surplus in the post-merger equilibrium equals
The increase in overall (world) welfare, however, does not mean that both countries can equally participate in the respective gains. To determine the national welfare effects, let us first look at consumer surplus changes in the Western economy. They are given by
Noting further that profit gains in W equal Π W (r) = [A − 17/16]r, we find that welfare effects in the Western economy are given by
By virtue of (20), we can conclude that the Western country is worse off after the merger if r < 1/4, while it benefits from the merger if r > 1/4. Hence, it is intuitive that there exists a critical country size for welfare gains from a merger. Due to a quadratic shape of the transport cost function, this critical country size is smaller than 1/2. If r = 1/4, total transport cost expenditures of W are the same in the pre-and post-merger equilibrium, implying that in this particular case the merger does not affect welfare in the Western economy. However, if r > (<)1/4 total transport costs decline (increase) so that welfare in W is higher (lower) in the post-merger equilibrium.
Due to symmetry in the production costs, we can also conclude that the Eastern economy is better off after the merger if r < 3/4, while it is worse off if r > 3/4.
A final issue we need to address is the impact of a merger on the direction of trade.
From Fig. 1 we see that the merger does not influence the position of the marginal
13 From the first line of (20), it is immediate that ∆V W (r) is negative if r ∈ (0, 1/4), while ∆V W (r) is positive if r ∈ (1/4, 1/2]. Furthermore, defining B(r) ≡ (7/16)r − r 2 /4 − 1/8, with B (r) >, =, < 0 ⇐⇒ 7/8 >, =, < r and noting B(1/2) = 1/32 > 0, B(1) = 1/16 > 0, we can conclude that ∆V W (r) > 0 holds for all r ∈ (1/2, 1].
consumer, i.e., b
Hence, recollecting from above that the small country exports the consumption good in the pre-merger equilibrium, it is immediate that the direction of trade is unaffected by the merger, as long as 1/4 < r < 3/4. In this case, the Western production plant remains located in the Western country and the Eastern production plant remains located in the Eastern country. If, however, r < 1/4 or r > 3/4, the smaller country loses its production facility and, thus, becomes an importer of the consumption good. In this case, a merger reverses the direction of trade.
Proposition 2 summarizes the most important results of the previous analysis.
Proposition 2 If c = 0, a merger raises profits, reduces consumer surplus and increases overall (world) welfare. If 1/4 < r < 3/4 both countries benefit from the merger and the smaller country exports the consumption good in the pre-as well as the post-merger equilibrium. On the contrary, if r < 1/4 (r > 3/4), welfare declines in the small Western (Eastern) country and the direction of trade is reversed.
Proof. Analysis in the text.
While the assumption of equal production costs provides an interesting benchmark for our analysis, it seems natural from the viewpoint of empirical facts to allow for production cost differences across firms. Therefore, in a next step we investigate how the results in Proposition 2 change if c > 0.
Costs are different ex ante and ex post
If c > 0, the more productive Western producer sets a lower mill price, serves a larger share of consumers and earns higher profits in the pre-merger equilibrium: p . Second, by moving both production sites to the interior of the market, overall transport costs decline, so that mill prices can be further increased without reducing overall consumer demand. Third, in addition to these two types of profit gains, which are also present in the case of identical production costs, the integrated firm has an incentive to increase the market share of its low-cost Western production facility: d W > b n i . Two subcases can be distinguished with respect to the size of d E , i.e., the market share of the Eastern production facility. If the production cost disadvantage of the Eastern plant is sufficiently small (0 < c < 3/4), the integrated firm will operate two production plants at locations x W ∈ (1/4, 1/2) and x E = (3/4, 1), respectively. In this case, we have d E > 0.
If, however, production cost differences are sizable (3/4 ≤ c ≤ 6 − √ 27), the integrated firm shuts down the Eastern production facility and serves all consumers from the center of the market to minimize overall transport costs: x W = 1/2. This implies d W = 1 and
We discuss these two subcases, separately.
Case I: 0 < c < 3/4
If the integrated firm operates two production plants, it serves consumers on interval [0, b i ], with 0 < b i < 1, from its Western production facility and consumers on interval (b i , 1] from its Eastern production facility. In this case, profit-maximization leads to plant 14 Similar to our analysis in Subsection 3.1 we can conclude that if the integrated firm wants to serve consumers on some interval [b l , b r ] through production in its Western (Eastern) plant, it is always the best strategy to locate this plant in the center of the interval, in order to minimize transport costs. 
which is positive and strictly increasing in c. 16 With a higher cost differential, the inte- With the overall welfare effects at hand, we can now turn to the national implications of the merger. Since the formal derivation of the national welfare effects is tedious, we have relegated it to the Appendix with the most important insights being summarized in the following lemma.
15 It is notable that a higher cost parameter c lowers the profit gain. On the one hand, a higher c reduces the intensity of price competition in the pre-merger equilibrium, thereby leading to higher total profits: dΠ n /dc = 2c/9 > 0. On the other hand, in the post-merger equilibrium the firm chooses a price strategy that renders the marginal consumer indifferent between buying and not buying. Hence, prices do not depend on marginal production costs (provided that these costs are not too high) and the firm has to bear the entire burden of a c-increase. This explains dΠ m /dc < 0. Aside from this negative effect of a c increase on ∆Π, we can identify a positive effect on ∆CS. On the one hand, there is a negative impact of c on CS n , because firms increase their mill prices and overall transport cost expenditures rise.
On the other hand, with profit-maximizing prices of the integrated firm being independent of production costs, there is only an indirect effect of a c increase on CS m , due to adjustments in plant location. This relocation effect is of second order, implying that ∆CS increases in c. 16 See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of (21). There are two sources of welfare gains from a merger, if c ∈ (0, 3/4). On the one hand, b n i > b m i /2 implies that overall transport cost expenditures fall (i.e., T n > T m in Fig. 2 ). On the other hand, a merger leads to a more efficient production structure, as this implies that the Eastern economy will always benefit from a merger between the two firms. In contrast, if c < −3/8 + √ 27/8, there exists a critical levelr E ∈ (3/4, 1), such that the Eastern economy is better (worse) off after the merger, ifr E > (<)r.
A final element to determine is the role of a merger for the trade pattern. Similar to Subsection 3.1, we can note that r < x m W implies that the Western country exports the consumption good in the pre-merger equilibrium, while it loses its local production facility and, therefore, imports the consumption good in the post-merger equilibrium. In analogy, r > x m E implies that the Eastern country loses its local production facility and imports the consumption good in the post-merger equilibrium (although it was an exporter of the consumption good in the pre-merger equilibrium). Furthermore, in contrast to Subsection 3.1, where the address of the marginal consumer was not influenced by a merger between the two firms, we have b 
with the derivation details being deferred to the Appendix. Noting that c ≤ 6 − √ 27, we can conclude that a merger raises welfare, i.e., ∆V > 0, with the respective welfare gain A final issue to be addressed is the impact of a merger on the trade pattern. In Similar to Case I, we can sum up the parameter ranges over which a merger reverses the direction of trade and obtain R = 1 − c/6. An increase in cost differential c reduces the likelihood of a trade reversal if country size is randomly drawn from the unit interval.
18 Closing the Eastern production plant and locating the Western facility at the center of the market, gives rise to two types of welfare gains. On the one hand, b n i > 1/2 implies that overall transport cost expenditures are lower in the post-merger equilibrium, due to the assumption of quadratic transport costs (i.e., T n > T m in Fig. 3 ). On the other hand, there is a decline in overall production costs if the Western facility serves all consumers.
Together with the insights of Case I, this implies that the likelihood of a trade reversal reaches a maximum at c = 3/4.
With the formal analysis of cases I and II at hand, we can now summarize the main effects of a merger on welfare and the trade pattern.
Proposition 3 Proof. Proposition 3 follows from the analysis above.
Costs are different ex ante but identical ex post
In this subsection, we address the consequences of a technology transfer.
19 For this purpose, we assume that production costs differ ex ante, i.e., c > 0, rendering the pre-merger equilibrium in Subsection 3.2 the starting point of our analysis. After the merger, the integrated firm uses the best-practice technology in both production plants, implying that the post-merger equilibrium is the same as in Subsection 3.1. Fig. 4 depicts the price-location schedules for the pre-as well as the post-merger scenario.
Similar to the previous two subsections, the monopolization of the market induces a profit gain: ∆Π = A − 17/16 − c 2 /9 > 0. The consumer surplus change is given by ∆CS = [18/16 − A + c/2 − c 2 /36], which is negative due to our assumption about A.
19 There is strong empirical support for intra-firm technology transfer within the boundaries of multinational enterprises. See among others Fors (1998) and Girma and Görg (2007) . Similar to Long and Vousden (1995) and Ferrett (2006) we assume that techonology can be costlessly transferred between production plants.
Summing up, we obtain 20 ∆V = 1/16 + c/2 − 5c 2 /36.
∆V is positive, because a merger lowers transport cost expenditures (i.e., T n > T m in Fig.   4 ) and leads to a more efficient production structure if c > 0 and a technology transfer is possible. Similar to the analysis in Subsection 3.2, a higher cost differential c raises the merger-induced welfare gain. However, ∆V in (23) is larger than the respective values in (21) and (22). As compared to Case I, there are gains from the technology transfer, as the inferior Eastern production technology is replaced by the superior Western technology. In
Case II, the whole market was served by a single plant (using the Western technology), so that two-plant production exhibits a welfare gain due to a considerable decline in overall transport cost expenditures. Let us now turn to the national welfare effects, with the main insights being summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If the merger leads to a technology transfer and the use of the best-practice technology in both production plants, the following national welfare effects can be derived. 
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3 confirms our previous insight that a technology transfer provides an additional source of welfare gain. As the positive effect of a technology transfer increases with the cost differential c, it is intuitive that even very small countries can benefit from a merger if c is sufficiently large.
Let us now turn to the trade pattern effects. Similar to Subsection 3.1, we can identify r = 1/4 and r = 3/4 (> b n i ) as two critical levels of r for a trade-reversing effect of a merger. If r < 1/4, the Western country exports the consumption good in the premerger equilibrium, while it loses its local production facility and, therefore, becomes an importer in the post-merger equilibrium. In analogy, if r > 3/4 the Eastern economy loses its local production facility and becomes an importer of the consumption good in the post-merger equilibrium (although it was an exporter in the pre-merger equilibrium). The trade reversal in these two cases arises due to an adjustment in firm location. However, similar to the analysis in Subsection 3.2 (Case I), there is a third parameter range, where a trade reversal occurs. If r ∈ (1/2, b n i ), the Western country exports the consumption good in the pre-merger equilibrium, while it imports the consumption good in the post-merger equilibrium. In this case, the trade reversal occurs due to a shift in the address of the marginal consumer. We can sum up the different ranges, where a trade reversal occurs and obtain R = 1/2 + c/6. Interpreting R as the likelihood of a trade reversal after the merger if country size r is randomly drawn from the unit interval, we can conclude that this likelihood increases with the ex ante cost differential c and is smaller than the respective values in Subsection 3.2. Hence, all other things equal, a technology transfer reduces the likelihood of a trade reversal after the merger. This completes our formal analysis of Subsection 3.3, with the main insights on welfare and trade structure effects being summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 A technology transfer reinforces the positive welfare effects of a merger, implying that, irrespective of the prevailing size differences, both countries are better off after the merger, if the ex ante cost differential and thus the gains from the technology transfer are sufficiently high. The likelihood of a trade reversal is reduced as compared to a scenario with asymmetric production costs and no technology transfer.
Proof. Proposition 4 follows from the analysis above.
Concluding remarks
This paper uses a spatial modelà la Hotelling to shed light on the consequences of a cross-border merger for firm location, welfare and the trade pattern. Starting point of the analysis is the long-run free trade equilibrium in Tharakan and Thisse (2002) with two asymmetrically sized countries, quadratic transport costs, and two firms located at the Western and Eastern boundaries of the Hotelling line, respectively. In this setting, we show that joint profit maximization after the merger not only leads to an increase in mill prices but also to a relocation of production sites towards the center of the market in order to reduce transport cost expenditures. In addition, we also account for the possibility of an intra-firm technology transfer. By separating these channels of influence, the analysis provides a detailed picture of the possible merger effects.
With respect to the welfare implications, the main insights of our analysis can be summarized as follows. A merger raises profit income and reduces consumer surplus.
Global welfare unambiguously rises in response to a merger, and the merger-induced welfare gain increases in the ex ante cost differential across firms. There are interesting national implications, as well. Contrasting the results in this paper with the findings in Tharakan and Thisse (2002) , we can formulate the following conclusion. In the benchmark scenario with identical production costs, a movement from autarky to a long-run free trade equilibrium lowers welfare in the large country and, depending on the magnitude of the size difference, may render the small country better or worse off. By way of contrast, a merger unambiguously increases welfare in the large country but lowers welfare in the small country if the size difference is sufficiently pronounced. With ex ante production cost differences and a technology transfer after the merger, there are additional positive welfare effects, so that both countries may benefit from a merger, irrespective of the prevailing size differences.
Our analysis also points to the possibility of a trade reversal after the merger. Such a trade reversal may either arise, if the smaller country loses the local production facility after the adjustment in plant location, or it may be triggered by a change in the address of the marginal consumer, who is indifferent between purchasing from the two producers.
Neither of these two explanations for a trade reversing effect can be discussed in traditional models of trade which lack a spatial dimension.
In summary, the analysis in this paper contributes to the more general insight that accounting for intranational adjustments is necessary to obtain a detailed picture of how the recent wave of globalization affects trade patterns and welfare. Focusing on crossborder mergers and the triggered relocation of production plants in space, the paper points to a new channel through which globalization works. This channel has sparked considerable interest in the controversial discussion on how to design EU merger policy (Horn and Stennek, 2007) , but has not been addressed by previous economic research.
Of course, being the first study that emphasizes this channel of influence, our analysis cannot tackle all questions that may be relevant in this context. In particular, we focus on two firms, which guarantees the existence of merger gains and, at the same time, rules out a discussion about the attractiveness of national relative to international mergers.
Second, we depict our analysis in a linear Hotelling model, which is somewhat specific due to the existence two endpoints. Finally, by abstracting from international trade impediments, our model may be a good representation of two EU member countries but it is less adequate for the analysis of two countries which are not member of a free trade area. While extensions in all of these dimensions are important, they are clearly outside the scope of the analysis in this paper and thus left open for future research.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
Consider x W ∈ [0, 1], x E ∈ [0, 1] and (for the moment) c ≤ 1. In a first step, we show that in this case, an interior equilibrium with b i ∈ (0, 1) requires x W = 0 and x E = 1. For this purpose, we hypothesize that b i ∈ (0, 1) and differentiate π (x W , x E ) w.r.t. x . This gives:
According to (24) and (25), we can conclude that, for any
and ∂π E (·)/∂x E > 0 if c = 0. This confirms the well-known result that two producers maximize the distance between their production sites in a linear model with quadratic transport costs and identical production costs (see d 'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse, 1979) .
But what happens if production costs differ? To answer this question, note that
This implies x E = 1. Furthermore, let us hypothesize that there exists ax W ∈ (0, 1) that fulfills ∂π W (x W , 1)/∂x W = 0. From the second line of (24), we see that ∂π W (x W , 1)/∂x W = 0 requires c/(1 − x W ) − 1 − 3x W = 0 and thus
Noting further that
follows from (24), it is obvious thatx W ≤ 1/3 is required for a profit maximizing location decision on interval (0, 1) -and b i (x W , 1) ∈ (0, 1). From (26), we can therefore conclude that c ≤ 1 rules out an equilibrium with x W ∈ (0, 1), x E = 1 and b i ∈ (0, 1).
Put differently, if an interior equilibrium with b i ∈ (0, 1) exists, then c ≤ 1 implies
x W = 0 and x E = 1. Substituting into (6)- (10) So far, we have assumed that an equilibrium with positive demand of both producers exists. In principle, however, it may be attractive for the technologically advanced Wproducer to deviate from x W = 0 in order to serve all consumers. Profit-maximizing prices in this case are determined by p 
consumer surplus changes in the Western economy can be written in the following way
. 
Using
, where lim r→1 ∆CS W (r) = 18/16 − A + c/2 + 7c 2 /36 determines ∆CS in the text.
Furthermore, noting that the welfare effect in W is given by ∆V W (r) = ∆π W (r) + ∆CS W (r), we obtain 
To determine the role of r for the sign of ∆V W (r), it is useful to consider the different parameter domains in (28) 
The first line of (30) 
